By María Fernanda Cruz Chaves, Khadija Sharife (Barracuda Media), Maria Christoph (Paper Trail Media), Francisca Skoknic (El Clip) y Lukas Kotkamp (Follow the Money)
In March 2021, a senior executive at Deutsche Bank sent a presentation to his boss and team making the case to “cautiously” start onboarding high-risk clients to the bank’s correspondent banking business once again after a few years of self-imposed moratorium.
At the time, the bank was under the supervision of external monitors, who were tasked with ensuring the bank’s compliance with anti-money laundering and illicit transaction prevention measures, following multiple fines imposed by its regulators.
Just the previous month, the monitors had drawn up a report highlighting numerous shortcomings in Deutsche Bank’s controls relating to its international payments business. This business operates through the correspondent banking system, in which a financial institution — usually a larger bank — acts as an intermediary for a smaller one, enabling it to transfer money via its systems.
“The risk that criminal proceeds are being or will be laundered through the Bank remains a substantial and material risk, not an abstract one,” the monitors, lawyers Dawn Smalls and Lee Wolosky, said in their report to US authorities.
But the Institutional Cash Management department—which oversees correspondent banking—was determined to make Deutsche Bank a market leader in international payments. By its own reckoning, between 2007 and 2020, the bank had paid €13 million in fines directly for failures in its anti-money laundering controls in correspondent banking. It had also been fined $150-million in 2020 that was in part related to similar lapses.
But the business “remains profitable”, the presentation said. In fact, it had generated €4.7 billion in pre-tax, pre-bonus income in the same period. The positive balance showed the business’ “risk absorption capacity”.
The presentation is part of 15 million confidential Deutsche Bank files leaked by two whistleblowers to the journalists Khadija Sharife and Josy Joseph. Inside Deutsche Bank, a consortium of journalists from over 50 countries, was formed to investigate the leaked materials. The whistleblowers, whose identities are being protected, copied the files and removed them from the institution. Besides giving them to Joseph and Sharife, they also provided material to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the U.K.’s HM Revenue and Customs, their lawyer confirmed.
“We are deeply committed to serving the public interest,” they said in a statement. They said the public has a right to know about the bank’s misconduct and its extensive banking of oligarchs. According to one of the whistleblowers, they believed the files contained potential criminal misconduct regarding business relationships with corrupt regimes.
In a statement to this consortium, Deutsche Bank said it rejects “any suggestion that regulatory penalties are treated as a cost of doing business.” The bank added that when it proposed to lift restrictions on high-risk new clients for correspondent banking, it proposed to do so under “additional safeguards, including limits on eligible countries and clients, individual governance review with an AFC [anti-financial crime department] veto right, and post-onboarding reviews of actual client activity and key financial crime risk indicators.” Deutsche Bank stated that those restrictions were only lifted in 2025.
“With these safeguards in place, Deutsche Bank is committed to safely and sustainably conducting its correspondent banking business and ensuring our financial institution clients have a strong European bank provider option for US-Dollar and Euro clearing services,” the bank added.
The leaked documents bring to light a decade of shady money flows through the bank.
At the end of their time as monitors, in early 2021, Smalls and Wolosky were clear: failures that should have been remediated by then, “such as lax monitoring of the foreign correspondent banking business, are contributing to a lack of recognition of suspicious activity”.
Deutsche Bank’s internal documents show how despite repeated fines and public scandals, the bank continued to miss warning signs of money laundering and sanctions violations. From at least January 2017 and until at least December 2020, the bank failed to identify transactions tied to entities with close links to the Kremlin, which were potentially circumventing Western sanctions, as well as transactions linked to other entities suspected of involvement in corruption and drug money. It also moved funds tied to illegal gambling operators and to the adult entertainment industry without considering the associated sex-trafficking risks.
Reporters from the Inside Deutsche Bank consortium uncovered these and other lapses in the bank’s correspondent banking business in Colombia, Hungary, Panama, Russia, Turkey and other countries.
Multiple external fines also prove the bank was aware of problems with its safeguards since at least 2015. For instance, New York regulators found that Deutsche Bank failed to stop billions of dollars worth of alleged suspicious transactions linked to sanctioned entities and potential criminal activity. In 2015, 2017 and 2020, the bank reached settlements worth a cumulative $775 million with the New York Department of Financial Services. As part of the settlements, it agreed to make major improvements in its systems to prevent money laundering and sanctions violations. The independent monitors were appointed to oversee this.
In 2023, Deutsche Bank reached another settlement with US authorities for, “remaining exposed” to compliance risks “without sufficient internal controls”.
Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, had ordered Deutsche Bank in 2021 and 2023 to promptly fix its transaction monitoring systems. In September 2026, BaFin issued a new order giving the bank more time to comply. No compliance deadline has been publicly specified.
The bank continues to operate without criminal prosecution or licence revocations anywhere in the world to date for such failures.
Blocking the bad guys
Correspondent banking is the plumbing behind international money transfers. If a bank in Chile needs to send money to a bank in Pakistan but it does not have a direct presence there, it will probably involve one or more correspondent banks to carry the funds to the desired destination and currency.
This can be risky, because intermediary banks are exposed to the risks taken by their client banks. But many larger financial institutions do it because it’s “an enormously lucrative sector,” as Ulrich Göres, the former head of Deutsche Bank’s AFC department, put it. When transactions involve countries considered “high-risk” for financial crime, the intermediary bank will often charge higher fees in response.
That is why Göres believes that fines, in general, are a weak deterrent, unless they exceed the revenue previously generated.
Legally, banks must have effective systems to deter illicit transactions. This includes vetting and avoiding high-risk clients—including client banks without adequate oversight and compliance systems—as well as identifying any suspicious transactions that slip through and reporting them to the relevant authorities. Regulators require banks to prove they did everything in their power to protect the financial system from criminal money.
Think of it like an airport: while an airport cannot always prevent dangerous people or illicit materials from getting on flights, it must have sophisticated security checks in place to minimise the risk.
Tom Keatinge, a former banker and the director of the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, a UK-based think tank, told Inside Deutsche Bank, “If you look at the cases that are brought against banks for money-laundering failures, it’s almost always [for] a failure of systems and controls”—as opposed to criminal prosecution for money laundering.
“Accountability shifts from whether you allowed the bad thing to happen to whether you had all these processes and things in place,” said Alex Cobham, an economist and the CEO of Tax Justice Network, an independent advocacy group. “In other words: the regulatory system only asks you to have good monitoring structures in place, not to actually stop the crime.”
Even by that standard, Deutsche Bank’s own documents show how key security checks were frequently absent or arguably ignored.
“A live and growing laundromat”
Barely a year before the Institutional Cash Management department was discussing the onboarding of more high-risk clients, the bank’s AFC unit discovered a suspicious financial network that had funneled nearly two billion dollars through its systems over three years. The network involved, among others, companies linked to the sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska—a former ally of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin.
Email exchanges show high-level executives worrying that they had discovered this flow of potentially criminal money too late.
In May 2020, a managing director with the AFC unit wrote to his team in Frankfurt about a recent summons by the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)—Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office. He said he had a bad feeling about the summons, and expected the police to ask why the bank had not discovered the network earlier through routine transaction monitoring.
The authorities were looking for information about Deutsche Bank’s relationship with MKB Bank, a major financial institution in Hungary. The bank was part owned by close allies of Viktor Orbán, then the country’s prime minister.
In April 2020, Deutsche Bank had told MKB Bank that it would no longer serve as its correspondent bank. This followed an internal investigation that Deutsche Bank staff believed had uncovered “a live and growing laundromat scheme” with “numerous indications for a criminal network.” The investigation identified more than €1.7 billion in suspect transactions.
It appears that it had taken the bank three years to detect the network and investigate the nearly 3,000 transactions that had taken place since 2017.
The “laundromat” was uncovered by a junior employee almost by accident during the course of a deep dive on a transaction. This prompted a senior executive of the bank’s AFC department to joke that they had found another “employee of the month”. He added that the bank’s systems “explicitly failed to detect it.”
The employee uncovered a network of shell companies centred on 15 core entities, most based in Hong Kong, Cyprus and the United Kingdom—jurisdictions criticised over their financial secrecy. Internally, Deutsche Bank referred to the resulting money-laundering investigation as “Project Wingman”. Inside Deutsche Bank reporters traced links to Deripaska on companies that sent or received money from the Wingman network, even though his name is absent from those companies’ official records and he was not named in Deutsche Bank’s own investigation.
Deripaska, who once enjoyed a close relationship with Putin, was sanctioned by the United States in 2018 over his attempts “to subvert Western democracies” and barred from the US financial system. After multiple attempts by reporters, he did not answer questions from Inside Deutsche Bank.
Questioned about Project Wingman, the bank said “Deutsche Bank takes its anti-financial crime and sanction-related obligations extremely seriously. In a letter to this consortium, the bank confirmed that it “identified the transaction pattern through an internal financial-crime investigation”. It subsequently “reported relevant matters to the competent authorities and responded to requests for information.”
MKB Bank requested an extension after Deutsche Bank moved to end the relationship in April 2020. Deutsche Bank employees worried that severing the relationship too abruptly could trigger “a potential liquidity shortage for MKB Bank, which could reach critical levels within a few days.”
This would be ”unprecedented in the financial world and would confirm to the entire market that there is a massive problem.” Deutsche Bank only stopped all transactions in October 2020.With regards to its relationship to MKB bank, Deutsche Bank said it terminates relationships through “controlled transition to protect payment-system integrity and enable the orderly migration of services, while appropriate risk controls and monitoring remain in place.”
It further said that all weaknesses go through an internal review process, with measures including “restrictions on activity, further escalation until outstanding issues are addressed, or termination of the business relationship.” The bank put emphasis that it is “committed to complying with applicable anti-money-laundering, sanctions and financial-crime requirements and continually reviews and enhances its controls.”
German authorities confirmed to this consortium that they closed the investigation after asking for collaboration from Hungarian authorities, which refused to take over the case arguing that the location of the transactions was unknown.
MKB Bank was later merged into MBH Bank. Responding to questions from the consortium, MBH said its management “has investigated all improper or unlawful practices and incidents that came to its attention prior to 2020 and, where warranted, has taken the necessary legal steps”. Deutsche Bank said it was never fined in connection to the Wingman laundromat and that it “reported relevant matters to the competent authorities.”
Just a year later, the investment banking department at Deutsche Bank discussed onboarding a holding institution that absorbed MKB, later called MBH. A BIU executive, when seeking input from the correspondent banking department, wrote, “The business believes … the risks—which they see as largely reputational—are manageable.” It is unclear if Deutsche Bank finally decided to onboard MBH Bank as a client.
“Turn on the spigot”
The Wingman investigation was not a one-off. In early 2020, the AFC department was also busy with another internal investigation, code-named “Project Cali”, into Deutsche Bank’s relationship with Colombian banks.
Internal and external reports exposed how the bank failed to act on alerts coming from a huge flow in euro-donominated payments to Colombia, some of it with suspected links to the drug trade and human trafficking, among others. By its own reckoning, as of 2019, the bank controlled at least 60 to 80 percent of the country’s euro payment market.. After it processed transactions worth around $40 billion that year, several internal reports noted, Deutsche Bank presented “extremely low numbers” of suspicious activity reports (SARs)—none at all to authorities in Germany, and fewer than ten to authorities in the United States. Internal reports show that it had asked for very little information from its Colombian client banks.
Months later, in November 2020, the bank presented 230 SARs alerting authorities “including vice, sanctions, illicit money service businesses, drug trafficking, shell company activity and offshore tax haven flows”. A report by the bank’s independent monitors said the SARs exposed “alarming gaps in the Bank’s controls and review processes that failed to identify these problematic transactions in the first place,” although it praised the communication between Deutsche Bank and its Colombian partners after the findings.
According to the report, Deutsche Bank employees had earlier expressed concerns about transactions to and from Colombia. The monitors quoted a senior management employee saying that “something’s wrong” when the bank has multi-billion-euro business in the country but does not produce SARs. Another Deutsche Bank worker said, “you can’t just turn on the spigot in Colombia and let it flow without looking at this.”
The monitors were especially concerned about transactions involving companies connected to the adult entertainment industry. They feared that the same mistakes that led Deutsche Bank to onboard the convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein as a client were evident in its behaviour with Colombian banks. “Bank personnel initially did not evince much interest in the potential for adult human trafficking and exploitation”, they said.
The leak reveals that €8.4 million was transferred to individuals in Colombia from a payment service company called Dek-Co (UK)—whose owner, Anton Postolnikov, was also banking the Tate brothers, infamous for their alleged involvement in sex-trafficking through Dek-Co and another financial institution. Dek-Co (UK) made more than 2,000 transactions in six months with the transfer sums averaging €4,000 and justified as “transfer of own funds”. Both Tate brothers deny allegations against them.
The monitors quote a Deutsche Bank employee saying the recipients may have been “innocent victims” or could have been “exploited”. But, according to the monitors, the same employee insisted they received guidance that they did not need to check the origins of the transactions.
Dek-Co (UK) replied to questions from the consortium denying that it provided any illicit services. The company said it “has always reported such transactions to the regulatory and law enforcement authorities immediately upon their discovery.” It did not address questions about banking the Tate Brothers, saying it could not refer to any specific clients.
Internally, the bank appears to have worried more about connections to drug trafficking rather than sexual exploitation. Referring to Dek-Co (UK), an internal document stated a suspicion that the movement of funds “back into Colombia is an attempt to distance the money from the criminal proceeds of drugs.”
A further two companies highlighted by Project Cali were either noted by Deutsche Bank itself or by media reports to be implicated in alleged corruption surrounding Venezuela’s government food-distribution programme..
Asked about these findings, Deutsche Bank said that Project Cali was “a historical review that led to specific remediation measures and a broader reassessment of financial-crime risks across Deutsche Bank’s correspondent-banking portfolio.”
It added that “Decisions on suspicious-activity reporting are governed by jurisdiction-specific legal and confidentiality requirements, and we therefore cannot comment on individual reports, transactions, entities or counterparties.”
A Russian doll
By the end of 2020, the bank expanded the Project Cali model of investigation to its operations in connection to Russia, under the code name “Project Oak”.
Its investigation showed how Russian state-owned and private banks enabled the movement of money to and from shell companies, some of them connected to Russian oligarchs under US sanctions. The banks used Deutsche Bank’s correspondent banking services.
Project Oak identified 420 potential shell companies that transacted €2.7 billion through Deutsche Bank’s correspondent services. The bank found that eight of them were connected to sanctioned individuals or to other kinds of financial crime risks.
Multiple reports showed how these companies employed common money laundering methods, such as the use of straw men as proxy owners and the rapid transfer of funds through multiple countries. They were allowed to move millions of euros.
Russian banks played a crucial role in moving the money, including two with close ties to the Kremlin—Alfa Bank, then owned by the oligarchs Petr Aven and Mikhail Fridman, and the state-owned Sberbank.
This included over €1.16 billion moved between Russia and Switzerland during a three-month period in 2020 under the rationale “transfer of own funds”. The investigators found that the money was likely connected to another billionaire oligarch with links to the Kremlin, Suleiman Kerimov, using a “close family” relative as a frontman. Deutsche Bank described the company moving the funds as an apparent “vehicle for moving and spending the wealth of the oligarch”. When asked by Deutsche Bank, Alfa-Bank said the company belonged to another corporation with no shareholders and Sberbank said it belonged to a relative of Kerimov’s. Kerimov did not reply to the questions posed by this consortium.
Project Oak also found that a UK company linked to Deripaska, who had been subject to US sanctions since April 2018, transferred €773,700 of “own funds” through Sberbank across four months in 2020 to another bank in St Lucia, with Deutsche Bank as the correspondent bank.
The bank’s investigative unit stated that neither Alfa-Bank nor Sberbank provided any adequate explanations for the origins of the funds in question. When Deutsche Bank executives presented the results of Project Oak to New York regulators in August 2021, they said shell companies linked to sanctioned entities were now part of their sanctions screening list, and that other high-risk entities identified had been put on a list to block their transactions.
Alfa-Bank and Sberbank did not respond to questions from Inside Deutsche Bank. Nor did Deripaska or Kerimov. Deutsche Bank said that compliance with sanctions had been “a central aspect of the bank’s approach” to its Russian business. It also rejected “any suggestion that Deutsche Bank sought to help clients evade sanctions.”
Until at least March 2022, Deutsche Bank offered correspondent banking services to Russian banks including Alfa-Bank and Sberbank. In August 2021, an internal document recorded an 82-percent reduction in the bank’s number of correspondent banking clients in Russia between 2015 and 2021. But, the same document showed, the bank’s relevant market share remained largely unchanged as Sberbank, Russian’s largest bank, continued to use Deutsche Bank as its main correspondent euro-clearing provider.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began barely six months later.
Asked about the results of Project Oak, the bank said that it was “an internal review conducted in 2021 to assess potential financial-crime risks in activity processed for Russian correspondent-banking clients. Risk indicators are not, by themselves, proof that a transaction involved a sanctioned party or breached sanctions. Where potential concerns are identified, they are addressed in line with applicable policies and legal requirements”
“Over the past decade, Deutsche Bank has materially strengthened its financial-crime controls and expertise through significant investment across the first and second lines of defense. We have also substantially reduced the risk profile of our correspondent banking business, including by exiting certain former clients and countries. These improvements strengthen our ability to manage the inherently elevated financial crime risk in this business,” the bank added.
How to (not) leave a toxic bank
Deutsche Bank’s Russian interests incurred regulatory penalties from US and German authorities beginning in 2017. These were connected to the Russian mirror trades scheme—a multi-billion-dollar money-laundering operation—and the Danske Bank scandal.
Deutsche Bank was a major correspondent bank for the Estonian branch of Danske Bank, a Danish multinational. Some €267 billion flowed through the branch between 2007 and 2015, roughly half of it from Russia and other former Soviet states. US regulators fined Deutsche Bank $336 million partly in connection with the affair. German authorities fined it €13.5 million.
Inside Deutsche Bank documents show that Deutsche Bank’s US office discussed stopping the processing of payments for Danske Bank’s Estonian branch in 2013. Staff were worried about the proportion of the branch’s business dedicated to people who did not live in Estonia, and expressed concern that Danske Bank did not cooperate when they asked for more information. But the relationship only terminated in October 2015.
Deutsche Bank’s group audit unit discovered much later, in 2019, that the bank had multiple shortcomings in their due diligence with Danske Bank. It also found that, as of 2018, the bank did not have objective internal criteria by which to decide to terminate such a relationship.
In a response, Danske Bank said: “The money laundering case was clearly very serious, and what happened during those years should never have happened. We expressed our regret at the time and have consistently done so since. The case was subject to extensive investigations by the bank and the relevant authorities, and in 2022, the matter was concluded through coordinated resolutions with the Danish and US authorities. Since then, Danske Bank has implemented fundamental changes across the bank and invested significantly in systems, capabilities and controls aimed at preventing and detecting financial crime.”
Smalls and Wolosky, the bank’s independent monitors, concluded in 2021 that Deutsche Bank’s criteria for exiting a relationship with a client bank remained deficient and unclear. The bank said it has “substantially reduced its risk profile in this business, including exiting high-risk clients and countries”.
The problems with Deutsche Bank’s correspondent banking business touched almost every continent over the last decade. In 2015, despite having filed SARs in relation to the 1MDB scheme—in which more than $4.5 billion was allegedly stolen from Malaysia’s state investment fund and laundered through global banks—Deutsche Bank continued to process millions in transfers linked to Jho Low, the financier allegedly at the center of it. 1MDB, a state-owned investment company, is now suing Deutsche Bank for allegedly moving part of the funds.
Questioned about its role in the 1MDB scandal, Deutsche Bank said 1MDB made “material misrepresentations and omissions to Deutsche Bank officials” and that it has “cooperated fully with regulatory and law enforcement authorities.”
In February 2016, the bank’s Senior Management Review Committee gave the Turkish state-owned Halkbank, a correspondent banking client, its highest possible risk score. It was concerned over potential sanctions evasions, money laundering and terrorist financing.
First there was a public bribery scandal in Turkey in 2013, where Turkish-Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab was suspected of bribing Halkbank’s CEO at the time. Then in March 2016 Zarrab was arrested in the US, which accused him of laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran, mainly via Halkbank. Yet it wasn’t until a year later that Deutsche Bank ended its correspondent banking relationship with Halkbank following the arrest of a Halkbank executive in New York in April 2017. Halkbank did not reply to questions posed by this consortium’s journalists.
Even then, Wolosky and Smalls later found, parts of Deutsche Bank—including its corporate finance and trade finance operations—decided to carry on their relationships with Halkbank. For the independent monitors, continuing with trade finance operations was “particularly concerning.” Both Zarrab and Halkbank were indicted in the US. The Trump administration later dropped the Halkbank case and Zarrab pleaded guilty, cooperated, and was sentenced to time served.
In response to requests for comment, Deutsche Bank said “We do not comment on potential, former or existing client relationships.” The bank went on to say “Deutsche Bank maintains risk-based controls designed to comply with applicable sanctions and anti-financial-crime requirements. Over recent years, the bank has made extensive enhancements to client due diligence, transaction monitoring and its wider control environment. We do not comment on confidential internal reviews, regulatory interactions or related reporting obligations.”
In August 2019, Banesco Panamá came under elevated scrutiny after Deutsche Bank realised that almost half of its clients do not live in Panama but Venezuela. Deutsche Bank’s internal assessment also showed that Banesco Panamá’s affiliate banks and clients made use of shell structures across the British Virgin Islands, the Bahamas and Hong Kong, all reputed for financial secrecy. One of those clients was Alejandro José Arroyo Pérez. Banesco Panamá admitted as part of the Deutsche Bank assessment that Arroyo Pérez was a suspected frontman for a “drug trafficker”. (Although the person mentioned by the bank has never been prosecuted or publicly investigated on this account, he was sanctioned by the United States in 2018.) The assessment also said that one of Arroyo Pérez’s companies was connected to the Danske Bank scandal. The suspected frontman is now in jail and under trial in Venezuela for corruption.
Reporters from this consortium reached out to Arroyo through his lawyer. By the deadline provided, he had not replied.
After the internal evaluation, Deutsche Bank decided to elevate the case of Banesco Panamá to its Correspondent Banking Client Review Council for additional checks. In response to this consortium’s questions, Banesco Panamá confirmed it still uses Deutsche Bank as a correspondent. “With regard to the individuals and organisations mentioned in your letter,” it said, “we would like to clarify that they are not clients of Banesco Panamá”.
Questioned about its relationship with Banesco and Venezuelan clients, Deutsche Bank said it “maintains a comprehensive risk-based framework for correspondent banking relationships and regularly reviews those relationships in line with applicable legal, regulatory, and internal requirements”
“It’s always a game,” said Cobham, of the Tax Justice Network, about the reluctance to leave certain clients. “A calculation about how long and how much you can carry it on in order to continue to profit.”
Walking in circles
By 2021, Deutsche Bank had been promising New York regulators for years that it had a plan to repair its transaction monitoring system. But, in June that year,the bank’s head of correspondent banking at the time said to a colleague that he did not know how to fix the problem.
“Transaction Monitoring is still a black box to me,” he wrote to a new managing director. “Here I lack the transparency and understanding on what we are doing or should do” for correspondent banking, he said, and admitted he did not know “What ‘good should look like’.”
Cobham said the fact that a high-level bank executive does not know what good should look like on transaction monitoring “tells you that it hasn’t ever been a first-order board issue”.
By 2023, the bank had still not made sufficient progress on improving its compliance systems and controls. That July, US regulators punished the bank again for insufficient remediation to its anti-money laundering and sanctions monitoring programs. The underlying regulatory findings revolved around the same issues pointed out by the bank’s independent monitors two years earlier. Deutsche Bank was fined $186 million.
Experts consulted by Inside Deutsche Bank said penalties of this size are of little consequence to a multi-billion-dollar business. “It seems that they only view these fines as a cost of doing business,” Keatinge, of the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, said. “And, so long as they’re not too excessive, then the message is—crack on.”
“Nobody’s worried they’re going to prison,” Cobham said. “Nobody’s worried it will have any personal consequences for them whatsoever, except possibly their bonus. And until that changes, it’s only ever a cost-of-business calculation.”
Additional credits: Cynthia O’Murch (Financial Times)Simon Bowers (Finance Uncovered), Margot Mollat (The Gecko Project), Patricia Marcano (Armando.info), Craig Shaw (The Black Sea), Roman Gautam (Himal), Zeynep ?entek (The Black Sea), Emma Prest (Barracuda Media)
The Inside Deutsche Bank leak was obtained by Indian author and journalist, Josy Joseph, and South African investigative journalist, Khadija Sharife. It was coordinated globally by Barracuda Media in South Africa, and the Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación Periodística (CLIP) in Latin America, with technical support from the Data and Research Center (DARC) in Germany.



